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Abstract
As the number  of cases in the World Trade Organization  A country's  trade share  is a pretty robust indicator
(WTO) dispute settlement system has increased,  there  of its likelihood  to be either a complainant or a
has been a greater effort by the academic community to  respondent.
analyze  the data for emerging trends.  Holmes, Rollo, and  * The frequently remarked  absence of the least
Young seek to develop  this literature  using data up to the  developed countries from the dispute settlement system
end of 2002 to ask whether recent trends confirm  can  be explained by their low volume of trade.
previously identified  patterns and to examine whether  * There is not much,  if any, evidence of a bias against
there are divergences  from the overall pattern according  developing countries either as complainants  or
to the type of dispute.  They focus on three questions in  respondents.
particular:  * Regulatory  issues  are fading as reasons for disputes
* What explains which countries are most involved  in  and trade defense  disputes are the rising issue.
complaints under the dispute settlement understanding?  *  Complainants  overwhelmingly win  (88 percent of
* Is there  a discernible pattern to which countries  cases).
win?  * There is no strong evidence that the rate  of
* Is there a difference to these patterns depending on  completion  of cases  is biased against newly
the type of measure  at the heart of the complaint?  industrializing  countries or traditional  less developed
The authors  find that:  countries.
This paper-a product  of Trade,  Development  Research  Group-is part of a larger effort  in  the group  to  analyze  the
behavior of the WTO dispute settlement system so as to help developing countries more effectively integrate into the global
trade environment.  An earlier version of this paper was presented to the World Trade Forum 2002. Copies of the paper
are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Paulina Flewitt,  mail
stop MC3-303,  telephone  202-473-2724,  fax 202-522-1159,  email address pflewitt@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research
Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://econ.worldbank.org.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at
p.holmes@sussex.ac.uk,  a.young@socsci.gla.ac.uk,  or lafdO@central.susx.ac.uk.  September  2003. (30 pages)
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countries they represent.
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their comments on earlier versions.EMERGING  TRENDS  IN WTO  DISPUTE  SETTLEMENT:
BACK TO THE GATT?
The revisions to the dispute settlement system negotiated  in the Uruguay Round and
implemented  in 1995 have some claim to be the most important revisions made  to the
post-1 947  system of trade rules.  They promised a system in which economic power
would  not, alone, matter in the implementation  of the rules.  Small countries could take
on big with hope of redress.  The changes also promised a shift from a politically driven
system of negotiated agreements to one where  increasingly the normal rules of public
international  law applied.  It further suggested increased potential for clashes between
domestic regulatory objectives and systems and international  agreements.
The early days of the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) dispute settlement system
were dominated  by unfinished business from the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)  period,  notably between the EU  and the US.  The key cases,  Beef
Hormones and Bananas in particular, raised strong feelings both on the intrinsic merits
of each case and on the legitimacy of the WTO.  High profile cases on environmental
legislation notably against the US on gasoline and shrimp/turtle brought significant
protest about WTO procedures and rules from US  environmental  non-governmental
organisations in particular.
As the number of cases in the system has increased there has been an increasing effort
by the academic community to analyse the data for emerging trends.  This paper seeks
to develop this literature by seeing whether recent trends confirm previously identified
patterns and by examining whether there are divergences from overall pattern according
to the type of dispute.  We focus on three questions in particular:
1.  What explains which countries are most involved in complaints under the
Dispute Settlement Understanding  (DSU)?
2.  Is there a discernible pattern to which countries win?
3.  Is there a difference to these patterns depending on the type of measure  at
the heart of the complaint?
We begin with a survey of the literature.  We then briefly introduce the data and
categories used in our analysis.  The third section summarises  the data and  presents
our key findings.  We conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of these
findings.  For reference,  the current state of play in the-DSU  is summarised  in Table 1.
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There is by now a well established  literature on the WTO dispute-settlement process.
Much of it is by eminent lawyers and looks at the systemic implications of cases and
groups of cases.  But there is in addition a small but growing literature by mainly by
political scientists and also economists  on the  patterns of use of the DSU.
The studies published to date have  principally address two issues:
1) who  uses the DS system?
2)  what measures are most prone to dispute?
There is also a less developed literature, which is closely related to the first issue, that
looks at some of the "law and economics"  aspects of the actual  process, such as who
wins cases and the cost and  benefits of settling.
Is use of the DSU biased?
Most attention  has been paid to who  uses the DS system,  and particularly whether
developing countries under represented.  The point of departure is who are the main
users of the DSU?  For the answer to be meaningful,  however,  this pattern must be
compared with what one should expect to see.  What is an unbiased pattern of usage is a
thorny question that the existing literature addresses in different ways.
The simplest statistical study which essentially looks at what has actually happened is that
of Park and Umbricht  (2001)  (see also Jackson (2000)).  They observe that the share of
cases brought by developed countries (DCs)  between 1995 and 2000 was 71 %, though
the proportion of cases against DCs  was 56%.  Less developed countries (LDCs)  were the
targets of 40% of cases and  initiated only 26%.  At least superficially the system seems to
show a bias against LDCs.  These measures,  however, just look at actual numbers and do
not attempt to compare  actual case with those "predicted"  using a yardstick based on an
explicit model as Horn,  Mavroidis and  Nordstrom  (1999)  do.
The data analysis is taken a lot further in the survey by Busch and Reinhardt (2002).2
One of the yardsticks they use is to compare usage of the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB)  with that of GATT.  In doing so they take account of the changing composition
of membership.  They find that less developed countries accounted for 31 %  of complaints
under GATT, but only 29%  of complaints under the WTO  in the period to 2000.  The share
of cases against LDCs rose from  8% to 37%.  These changes contrast with a rise in the
index of LDC 'member years' from 66%  in GATT to 75% in the WTO, again suggesting
the presence of bias against LDCs.
Horn, Mavroidis and  Nordstrom (1999),  however,  find that the bias may not actually be as
great as these findings suggest.  They set up a model to predict what one might expect to
be the pattern of disputes based on the premise that disputes should be correlated with
the number of incompatible measures a country's exporters encounter.  This is likely to
increase with the volume of trade,  but, they argue, not in a strictly linear way.  First,  there
is a threshold below which it is not worth litigating over a particular trade flow.  Second, the
number of barriers one encounters depends on the number of different products and
2  Busch and Reinhardt report on their own statistical analysis as well as that of other authors.  Their inspiration
is drawn from the work of Hudec (1993).
5markets in which one is trading.  The authors assume (as  is supported  by trade data)  that
in fact there will be a an increase in the 'diversity"  of barriers encountered as export
volumes rise, so that we should see a non-linear relationship between trade volume and
barriers encountered.  They thus predict that complaints by countries with higher export
volumes will be more than  proportionately high.  Although their analysis  is not as nuanced,
Busch and  Reinhardt (2002)  also find that the most active traders and those most
dependent on trade are more  likely to participate in disputes.
Horn et al (1999)  find that their predictive equation explains the rate of disputes rather well
(with an r2 of 0.86).  They do,  however, find that there are several particularly important
outliers.  The EU  and the US litigate more than they "should",  though Japan does so less.
India stands out as an exception of sorts in that that it litigates its fair share of cases
despite its low income level.  The deviations from the predictions appear to be correlated
with  income per head,  although this does not appear to be statistically significant.
There thus appears to be some evidence that the WTO's dispute-settlement system is
biased against LDC,  although there is some disagreement about how great the bias is.
The question, however, remains what explains the bias.  Horn,  Mavroidis and Nordstrom
(1999)  consider two possible explanations:  power and legal capacity.  They argue that the
data does not suppoprt a power interpretation,  but they do conclude that legal capacities,
may play some role in propensity to bring cases.
There is reason,  however, to treat Horn, Mavroidis and Nordstrom's  (1999)  conclusion
about the lack of importance  of power with caution.  They find that Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development countries,  including the Quad - Canada,  EU,
Japan and the US -- target developing countries less than their model  predicts,  so they
suggest that the evidence does not support the claim that power-based factors are
important.  But this result seems to be very sensitive to the specification of the predictive
model.3 The model is based  on the idea that a country is likely to encounter trade barriers
as a function of the number of pair wise product-markets combinations into which it sells.
But since the Quad accounts for only four of 142 WTO members the simplest version of
the model predicts that only about 3 percent of total disputes should arise among  these
partners.4
While most of the literature focuses on whether use of DSU by complainants is biased,
there is also an issue of who is targeted.  This has received much less attention in the
literature,  and  is one lacunae that we begin to address later.  It is not clear, for example,
how the Horn et al model could predict who might be targeted,  since it is largely based on
the characteristics of the exporters.  Further,  although Park and Umbricht (2001)  and
Busch  and Reinhardt (2002) found that LDCs seem to be disproportionately targeted
under the DSU,  this element in the DSU  "imbalance"  is quite sensitive to how countries
are classified. For example, this category may include newly industrialising countries
(NICs)  and India, which are both respondents and complainants in significant numbers of
cases.
3  Their Table 4a shows that Quad countries "netf  litigation is mostly against non-Quad OECD;  but their
Tables 4b and 4c comparing actual and predicted patterns of cases suggests that the predictions are
somewhat counter intuitive and sensitive to the model specification.
4We are extremely grateful to Henrik Horn for pointing this out; he also observes that as the model is
adjusted to count only "large"  pair wise product-market trade instances its predictions become closer to a
trade volume related prediction  and the discrepancy lessens.
6Busch  and Reinhardt (2002)  address briefly some factors that affect being targeted,  but
not with specific reference to developing countries.  They note that disputes tend to lead
to counter suits (55% of the time) and to others initiating similar disputes against the
respondent ('bandwagoning').
It should  be added that one conspicuous finding is that the least developed countries,
mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa,  have had almost no involvement in the DSU.
Who wins and loses
An  additional aspect of the bias question, is whether  certain types of countries win cases
more often.  There has been relatively little work done on this question.  Busch and
Reinhardt (2002)  attempt a first cut at who wins for the GATT period and find both that
there is a strong tendency for complainants to win and a tendency for decisions to be
given in favour of smaller countries.
We are not, however, aware of any comparable studies for the WTO period. One reason
for this is some thorny methodological and data problems.  Although  panel and appellate
body reports are made public, they are often difficult to interpret. This is made harder by
the fact that the notion of "winning"  is often difficult to determine.  A decision may find
against the respondent on only one of multiple counts, but the true significance of this
depends  on whether this was vital element in the contested  measure.  In  addition,  a
Respondent may have a particular measure  found incompatible with WTO rules,  but win
on a central issue of principle, as arguably the US did in Shrimp/ Turtle and the EU did in
Beef Hormones.5 A very simple measure of who wins cases is to go through the record
and to assign a "win" for the complainant if any of the respondent's rules were found to be
inconsistent with the WTO on any of the counts.  This is the approach we will use here,
though there may well be a better method available.
The issue of identifying winners,  as Busch and Reinhart (2002),  point out,  is complicated
further by the high number of disputes that never reach the DSU,  and a high proportion of
those that do, do not result in a panel report (see Table  1).  Information on "settled  or
inactive"  cases is especially hard to come by. Though there is a formal obligation to notify
settlements this is often ignored  and cases drop off the radar screen.  Even when
agreements  are reported, few details are provided.
Nonetheless, Busch and Reinhardt (2002)  analysed the pattern of settlements,  especially
in the GATT period.  They found no clear trends  in the willingness to settle or to go to a
panel,  although they did find that pairs of democratic  states are most likely to settle
disputes before a panel and that open economies (controlling for democracy)  are less
likely to make concessions.
Butler and Hauser (2000),  in a largely theoretical  paper also explore the incentives to
litigate, settle and appeal  in the context of a formal model. They conclude that a priori the
dispute-settlement system provides little disincentive to introduce WTO-inconsistent
measures, and quite strong incentives for a respondent against whom a ruling is given by
a panel to appeal and delay compliance. This reinforces Busch and Reinhardt's (2002)
'See  for example the headline in the Boston Globe 26/7/2002  'Canada,  U.S.  both claim victory in initial
WTO ruling on softwood lumber tariffs"
http://www.boston.com/dailynews/207/economy/Canada_U_S_both_claim_yictory_:  .shtml
7point that the only real test of whether a complainant wins is whether there  is compliance
with any decision that emerges.
What measures are most prone to dispute?
A third  issue that has received a fair degree of attention, is what products and measures
are most subject to disputes.  Much  of this analysis,  however,  has been descriptive.  Horn,
Mavroidis and  Nordstrom (1999)  report the distribution of cases during  1995-98 by product
and by agreement both by type of complainant.  Park and Umbricht (2001)  also look at
product types (goods only) and types of measure both by respondent type.  There has,
however,  been relatively little attempt to explain the revealed patterns.  Busch and
Reinhardt (2002) posit that there are two alternative hypotheses for what cases are
brought to the DSB.  One possibility is that only cases where there is a good chance of a
clear outcome will be brought. The other is that it is only where the rules are unclear that
you need a DSB decision.  The information  on settlements without a panel report leads
Busch  and Reinhardt to conclude that we cannot settle this issue.
Young (2002),  in a qualitative study, suggests that that perhaps there is a "dog that did not
bark in the night': in that a number of significant and quite-longstanding  trade barriers
stemming  from regulatory and environmental  issues have not yet been prosecuted before
the WTO.
What remains to be explored
There are very detailed analyses of the pattern of usage in earlier years.6 There is a clear
sense that LDC underused  the system.  It will be interesting to see if this has evolved in
the face of a number of favourable decisions,  in particular to see if a number of recent
decisions in favour of complainants  on anti-dumping  has spurred LDCs to litigate these
issues more.  All this analysis is of course subject to the problem of knowing what the
yardstick for comparison should be.
Looking at what complaints come before the WTO two issues stand out. The most under
expiored area lies in those cases that are not brought and cases that are brought but do
not go to a panel.  There may be ways to get at the former issue, but it is not the subject
of this paper.  The paper will examine whether there is a difference  in the type of cases
that are and are not settled.
The second  issue that is only briefly explored in the literature is the issue of coalition
formation in DS.  Busch and Reinhardt  (2002) note that the EU and the US intervene as
third parties or co-complainants in most cases. We have very little information  about the
pattern of coalitions that form. The EU  has been successful in mobilising a coalition
against the US on steel, with some WTO members  against whom it has acted  in the past.
It is not now difficult to identify who has intervened in a case,7 but it would  be a major
undertaking to identify on which side people enter.
6 Reinhardt has done very extensive work on the GATT era.
7This is now systematically tabulated in  the Overview Report. See note to Table 1.
8THE DATA AND  THE TERMINOLOGY
The basic data on disputes is taken from WTO (2003) and covers disputes up to 31
December  2002. We have taken each complainant as a separate dispute even where
these are taken as single case; e.g., bananas against the EU  (WS27) where each of the
US, Guatemala,  Mexico etc are taken as separate disputes. This results in us having 296
disputes rather than the 276  notified to the WTO at 31  December 2002.
We have aggregated the data into country groups corresponding to those used by Park
and Umbricht (2001,  page 215).  We specify the Quad separately plus other developed
countries (DC),  newly industrialising countries (NICs), transition economies (TECs),
traditional less developed countries (TLDCs)  and least developed countries (LLDCs).
Since there are no disputes involving LLDCs they do  not appear in the summary tables
and graphics but they are  included when calculating trade shares etc.
Data  on trade and incomes come from the World  Bank (2001,  2002). Other data
references are given at the appropriate points in the paper.
PRESENTATION  OF THE  FINDINGS
Who against Whom and When
This essentially descriptive section summarises the totality of cases between  1 January
1995 and 31  December 2002 and the pattern of cases over time.  It examines complainant
against respondent and the characteristics of cases over time.  Finally it tries out some
simple hypothesis about the pattern of cases.
Table 2 sets out a matrix of complainants against respondents over the whole  period.
What emerges strikingly from this table is the symmetry.  There is no enormous imbalance
between the incidence of complainant or respondent for each of the major groups. The
US, the NICs and the TLDCs are very closely balanced. Canada is more often a
complainant than a respondent by a ratio of 2 to 1,  while the EU  is a respondent in 20%
more  cases than it is a complainant.  The TECs are respondents twice as much  as they
are complainants (but note the small number of cases).
Table  2 WTO  Dispute Settlement  System:  All Cases  1995 - 2002
(Number of cases by country group)
Respondent
US  EU  Canada  Japan  DC  NIC  TEC  TLDC  Total
US  - 28  4  6  4  18  2  11  73
EU  25  - 3  6  0  14  0  11  59
c  Canada  10  6  - 1  1  2  1  1  22
.a  Japan  6  0  1  - 0  1  0  2  10
a  DC  5  2  1  0  1  1  3  3  16
E  NIC  19  12  3  0  0  4  2  15  55
0 o  TEC  0  0  0  0  0  1  5  1  7
TLDC  13  17  0  0  2  7  1  14  54
Total  78  65  12  13  8  48  14  58  296
9Within groups some interesting  trends emerge.  The EU and the US are the biggest
litigants over the period and are each other's most frequent adversaries (each accounting
for about 40% of the other's complaints). The rest of the developed countries (including
Canada and Japan)  account for 18% of the cases brought by the US, while the NIC, TEC
and TLDC  account for the remaining 43% of cases.  The equivalent figures for the  EU are
16%  and 41% respectively.  The NICs take 60% of their cases against the US, the EU
and Canada  and almost 30%  against TLDCs.  The TLDCs take just short of 60% of cases
against the  US and the EU  and a quarter against each other.
This pattern suggests that while the EU  and the  US are the biggest players it is not
obvious that the NICs and TLDCs are shy of taking part or are obviously being bullied by
the big players  in particular.
It is important to recognise that these figures mask significant changes over time.  Two
trends are particularly evident.  First, is the collapse in the number of new cases after
1997  (see Figure  1).  This is largely due to the collapse in new cases by the EU  and  US
(and to a lesser extent Canada and Japan), which in turn reflects a collapse in EU  and US
cases against each other (Figure 2).
Second, is the rise in the incidence of the US as a respondent just as the cases it brings
are falling (Figure 3).  None the less it is clear that up until end 2002 the balance of
respondent over complainant  is moving decisively in the direction of the US as a
respondent. A point we will return to when we examine what the cases are about. The EU
shows no such trend.  Its role as Respondent and Complainant are falling broadly in
tandem.  The NICs and the TLDCs emerge  as proportionately bigger users and bigger
targets of the system in recent years, although  in absolute terms the number of cases is
more stable than for the developed countries.
Figure  1 Cases  by Complainant 1995-2002
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Finally it may be worth noting from  Figure 2 that at least in frequency terms the perceived
tit for tat dispute pattern between the EU  and the US has fallen away as the number of
cases initiated against each other has fallen. Of course the cases that remain  are still
sensitive.
These trends may suggest that the perceived bias against developing countries in  the
early years of the dispute-settlement system may owe more to unfinished  business fromthe GATT dispute-settlement system between the US and various of its trading partners.
EU tit for tat may also play a role (Figure 2).
Tables 3 and 4 which concentrate on the  percentage distribution of cases by complainant
and respondent underline these trends. The US peaked as a complainant in 1997 with
37%  of all cases initiated and the EU peaked with 36% of all cases in  1998. Since then
they have both fallen to below 10% of cases initiated by 2001  but are both around 10% in
2002.
Table 3 Complainants  over time
(% of cases)
Trade
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Total  share*
US  24  31  37  23  29  27  4  12  26  18
EU  8  13  33  36  20  23  7  9  19  21
Canada  20  6  2  9  6  3  11  9  8  6
Japan  4  6  2  2  6  0  0  6  4  10
DC  0  4  9  7  9  0  0  12  5  5
NIC  16  19  11  7  14  27  36  29  18  22
TEC  0  0  0  7  3  0  7  3  3  3
TLDC  28  22  7  9  14  20  36  21  18  16
* share in 1998 merchandise trade of WTO membership  (excl lntra-EU  Trade)
Meanwhile, the US has gone from being a respondent in 10-20% of all complaints  in the
period 1995-98 to a plateau of 30% during  1999-2001, with a rise to 53%  in 2002, largely
due to the steel safeguard cases. The share of complaints against the EU  on the other
hand fell sharply after 1998.
Table  4 Respondents  over Time
(% of cases)
Trade
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Total  share*
US  14  21  20  16  35  30  30  53  27  18
EU  32  14  22  34  13  7  15  18  20  21
Canada  0  2  7  11  3  0  4  3  4  6
Japan  18  10  7  2  0  0  0  3  5  10
DC  9  2  2  5  0  0  0  6  3  5
NIC  23  19  15  14  26  23  22  3  17  22
TEC  5  2  0  7  3  3  7  0  3  3
TLDC  0  29  28  11  19  37  22  15  21  16
* share in 1998 merchandise trade of the 2002 WTO membership  (excl lntra-EU  Trade)
Tables 3 and 4 also allow us for the first time to look at the very simple hypothesis that
disputes will be proportionate to trade. This is not in reality a very different hypothesis from
the basic one tested  by Horn et al (1999) since the bigger trade is the more diverse it
tends to be. We  have used merchandise trade of WTO members  (the universe for
disputes) in  1998, the median year.
12We explored a variety of regression approaches. Annex B reproduces some of the simpler
results. We first of all explored the simplest hypothesis that total trade (or in this case the
share of world trade) was the explanation of a country's  propensity to be involved in WTO
disputes. We found that for both complaints  and respondents this variable explains over
80% of the variation in the number of cases by country. We considered a variety of other
variables to see if they made a difference and found that they did not. Income per capita,
for example,  makes no significant difference to involvement in DS  given the size of trade.
That is to say a large poor country doing lots of trade is as likely to be a complainant or a
respondent as a small rich one with the same trade value.
We also explored the question of whether different types of dispute had different
determinants.  Again we found that about 75% of the variation in the propensity to  bring
"trade defence"  cases (i.e. challenges against anti-dumping CVD  or safeguard decisions)
was explained by trade volumes.
We did find a change over time in the determinants of disputes.  During the early years of
the WTO (1995-98)  trade value alone explained  82% of the variance in willingness to
bring disputes, but more recently (1999-2002)  it only accounts for about 67%. This may  be
due to the dip in the share of disputes between the EU and the US  (see Figure 2) and an
increase  in the number brought by NICs and traditional developing  countries.
Overall this section suggests that the simple hypothesis that disputes will be proportionate
to trade shares is at least tenable. Regression analysis done by adding other potentially
significant variables such as income per head or measures of openness added  nothing to
the explanatory power of our estimates.
It must, of course, be recognised that the high correlations between disputes and trade
shares is dominated  by the data on the EU and the  US. However we argue that this is not
a "distortion"  since they do indeed  account for so many of the cases and  it would be
nonsense to exclude them. These data essentially confirm  what the tables tell us,  namely
that the high share of the  EU  and  US in disputes is roughly commensurate with their trade
share.
There does not seem therefore to be any strong evidence of significant bias as between
small and large countries or between richer and  poorer countries at least as far as
participation in the system  as between roles as complainants or respondents.  If anything
the evidence may  be consistent with  richer countries being  less present than trade shares
would suggest, which may  be attributable to Japan's lack of presence within the DS
system and  to the increasing  use of the system  by NICs and TLDCs.
Who and What Issues
On the question about what issues disputes are taken on we have  made a highly
simplifying assumption. We have decided against either a sectoral or an Agreement-by-
Agreement Article-by-Article approach.  Not least because many, if not most,  cases are
taken on multiple criteria and the overlaps leading to single cases scoring more than once.
Instead we have taken two main categories.  First,  cases dealing with issue of domestic
regulation which we have labelled 'Within Border'.  These encompass the new agreements
in the  Uruguay Round --  i.e. Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Trade-
Related  Investment Measures (TRIMs),  Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS),  Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)  -- as
13well as GATT Article 3 (national treatment).  The second category we have taken is Trade
Defence which covers anti-dumping,  countervailing  measures and  safeguards.  These two
categories cover 75% of all cases.
'Within Border  Cases
Tables 5 and 6 show the trends in cases dealing with 'within  border' issues. These
represent 44% of all cases in all categories initiated since 1995. The  US has been the
most frequent complainant  in this category (16% of all cases over the period 1995-2002)
and the EU the most frequent respondent followed by the TLDCs and NICs (see Table 5).
Table  5  Disputes on Within Border Issues: Who v. whom,  1995-2002
Respondent
Total  % of
US  EU  Canada  Japan  DC  NIC  TEC  TLDC  cases  cases
US  - 14  3  6  1  13  0  9  46  16
EU  10  - 3  3  0  4  0  6  26  9
Canada  1  5  - 1  1  1  0  0  9  3
X  Japan  0  0  1  - 0  1  0  2  4  1
(,;  DC  0  1  0  0  0  1  1  0  3  1
0 NIC  4  4  0  0  0  0  0  1  9  3
O  TEC  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  2  1
0  TLDC  2  12  0  0  2  2  0  4  22  7
total cases  17  36  7  10  4  22  2  23  121  41
% of cases  6  12  2  3  1  7  1  8  41
The total number of 'within border' cases initiated  in any year peaked in 1996 at 28. As a
share of annual cases within border cases peaked at 72%  in 1995 and has fallen in both
absolute and percentage terms since then (see  Table 6). Overall the fall in 'within border'
cases from a peak of 28 in 1996 to only 7 in 2001  explains two thirds of the overall fall in
cases in that period. It also maps the fall in cases initiated by the US. The close
association with the US as a complainant in part reflects the TRIPs cases that the US
undertook against developing countries, the Beef Hormones case under the SPS
Agreement and the distribution aspects of the bananas cases.  Shrimp/turtle and
reformulated gasoline also contribute to the  US appearances as a respondent. Once
more there is an element of unfinished  business from the GATT era in this, which might
suggest that over time these regulatory issues may be less present in the dispute-
settlement system than experience to date.
14Table 6  Disputes on Within  Border Issues by Complainant over Time
Complainants  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Total
US  5  14  10  3  6  6  0  3  47
EU  2  4  8  8  3  1  0  0  26
Canada  4  1  0  4  0  0  0  0  9
Japan  0  3  0  1  1  0  0  0  5
DC  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  1  4
NIC  2  2  0  1  1  1  1  4  12
TEC  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  2
TLDC  5  4  0  1  4  1  5  6  26
Total  18  28  19  19  16  9  7  15  131
% of all cases  72  52  41  43  46  30  25  44  44
in each year
Trade  Defence Cases
Tables 7 and 8 show the same data for the cases based on trade defence instruments.  These
represent 31% of all cases undertaken since 1995. The principal complainants  are TLDCs and NICs,
with the US and the NICs and TLDCs as the main respondents (see Table 7).
Table  7 Disputes  on Trade  Defence  Issues: Who v. Whom,  1995-2002
Respondent
US  EU  Canada  Japan  DC  NIC  TEC  TLDC  Total  % of
cases
US  9  0  0  1  3  0  0  13  4
EU  10  0  0  0  5  0  0  15  5
Canada  7  0  0  0  0  0  0  7  2
C
X  Japan  4  0  0  0  0  0  0  4  1
XDC  5  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  6  2
E  NIC  12  1  1  0  0  2  0  10  26  9
o  TEC  0  0  0  0  0  1  2  0  3  1
TLDC  4  2  0  0  0  3  0  7  16  5
Total  42  12  1  0  2  14  2  17  90  30
% ofcases  14  4  0  0  1  5  1  6  30
Over time the share of Trade Defence  cases in the annual number of cases initiated has
grown from  1  in  1995 to 20 in 2002.  Proportionately these cases have grown from 4%  of
all cases in 1995 to a peak of 68% in 2001  and 59%  in 2002 (see Table 8). This increase
in trade defence instrument cases explains what sustains the number of NICs and TLDCs
cases in the system and,  hence, their increased importance in the system  as the total
number of cases initiated each year has fallen.  It also largely explains the growth of the
US as a Respondent.
15Table  8 Trade  Defence  Cases  by Complainant  over time
Complainant  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Total
US  0  1  1  6  3  0  1  1  13
EU  0  1  2  2  4  2  3  15
Canada  0  0  0  0  1  3  3  7
Japan  0  0  0  0  2  0  0  2  4
DC  0  0  0  1  2  0  0  3  6
NIC  0  3  2  0  3  5  8  5  26
TEC  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  3
TLDC  1  1  2  2  2  3  4  1  16
Total cases  1  6  6  12  15  13  19  18  90
% of all
cases in  4  11  13  27  43  43  68  53  30
each year
The increase in the number of trade defence cases also maps the increase in anti-
dumping cases and in countries using anti dumping in the period  since 1995 (Kempton  et
al  1999, Stevenson,  2001)
WHICH  CASES  HAVE  COMPLETED?
Before turning to who wins and who loses it is worth pausing  on the question of whether
there is any bias in the pattern of cases that have completed.  It might be that poorer
countries are not able to resource the process to the degree that richer countries might
and that hampers their ability to put all considerations before a panel which in turn leads
to a more rapid throughput of cases where they are respondents and a lag where they are
complainants.
Table  9 Cases  Completed,  Cases Initiated and Trade Share
% of cases completed when...  % cases begun  as
Complainant  Respondent  Complainant  Respondent  Trade share
us  23  31  25  27  18
EU  26  11  20  20  21
Canada  10  10  7  4  6
Japan  5  5  3  5  10
DC  4  2  5  3  5
NIC  15  15  19  17  22
TEC  1  0  2  3  3
TLDC  16  17  18  21  16
correlation  coefficient  0.87  0.69
with trade  share
correlation  coefficient  0.94  0.89
with cases begun
Table 9 suggests that as far as complainants are concerned there is not much  difference
between cases completed  and cases started with high correlation coefficients (albeit on a
small number of observations). There  is some small sign that NiCs, TECs and TLDCs  are
16completing at a slower rate as both complainants and respondents compared with the
number of cases that they initiate.  But this may  result from the larger number of cases
started by the US  in the early part of the process rather than any bias.  Further,  their
completion shares are lower than their initiation shares when they are respondents, where
the bias might be expected in the other direction.
WHO WINS:  WHO LOSES
As noted  in the literature survey above, who wins is a more complex question than it looks
and a true answer would require a degree of legal analysis that the authors cannot
provide.  Further, the question is inevitably bound up with whether the respondent
complies and even if it does comply, whether it does so in a way that leaves the barrier
effectively in place.
We have taken a simple approach in which a case where the complainant wins on at least
one of the issues it raises is scored for the complainant.  This leads to a rather
straighfforward  conclusion that complainants win in 88% of cases that reach a final
conclusion in a panel or before the Appellate  Body.
Table 10  Who won against whom
(% of completed cases)
Respondent
us  EU  Canada  Japan  DC  NIC  TEC  TLDC  Total
US  40%  100%  67%  100%  80%  100%  76%
EU  91%  100%  100%  100%  100%  96%
'  Canada  50%  50%  100%  100%  100%  67%
*_ Japan  100%  100%  100%  100%
"  DC  100%  100%  100%  100%
o  NIC  100%  100%  100%  67%  93%
TEC  100%  100%
TLDC  100%  100%  0%  100%  93%
Total  91%  71%  100%  80%  100%  86%  94%  88%
Note: blank cells denote where there  are no cases completed.  A zero denotes where the
complainant has lost all cases against a particular respondent.
Table 10 suggests that Canada  and the  US have lost a higher share of the complaints
that they brought than the average.  Because of the greater losses by these rich countries
this table gives some support to the proposition that poorer and perhaps smaller countries
do better in the dispute settlement game.  It may also reflect the possibility that richer
countries can afford to take on more  speculative cases to placate domestic lobbies. The
figures in any individual cell should be treated with care since they represent a small
number of cases. For example, the poor hit rate of the US against the  EU is based on
only 5 cases which have reached  completion. The three lost cases were on the
classification of computer equipment against the EU  and the  UK and Ireland separately.
Each thus counts as separate cases against the  EU  even though it was the same case in
substance.
17Table  11  Cases  Won by Complainant over time
(% of completed  cases)
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  Total
Us  100%  75%  67%  100%  75%  76%
EU  100%  100%  100%  86%  100%  100%  100%  96%
w  Canada  100%  100%  0%  0%  67%  67%
*<  Japan  100%  100%  100%  100%
Ea  DC  100%  100%  100%
o  NIC  100%  75%  100%  100%  100%  100%  93%
TEC  100%  100%
TLDC  50%  100%  100%  100%  100%  93%
Total  86%  88%  87%  86%  94%  89%  86%  88%
Note:  blank cells denote where there are no cases completed. A zero denotes where the
complainant has lost all cases in a particular year.
There is no discernible trend in wins over time from Table 11,  although Table 12 suggests
that 'within border' cases are slightly more likely to be won than the average.
Table  12 Completed  Cases  Won by Complainant  by Issue,  1995-2002
(percent)
Within Border  Trade Defence  Other  Total
US  92%  100%  43%  76%
EU  93%  100%  100%  96%
X  Canada  75%  50%  100%  67%
X  Japan  100%  100%  100%
E  DC  100%  100%  100%  100%
O  NIC  100%  88%  100%  93%
TEC  100%  100%
TLDC  100%  75%  100%  93%
Total  93%  87%  81%  88%
STATUS  OF CASES
In  this section we examine whether there is any distinctive difference between cases that
are settled by a panel or the Appellate Body (Panel),  mutually agreed settlements (MAS)
and cases pending consultation after a year (PC after 1 year). This last category is an
attempt to get to those cases that, while officially still open, do not appear to be being
pursued.  Indeed some may be settled and the WTO secretariat not informed.  Tables 13
and 15 examine the distribution of cases in each category by class of Complainant and
Respondent respectively.
Table 13 Case status by Complainant
(% distribution compared with all cases initiated)
US  EU  Canada  Japan  DC  NIC  TEC  TLDC  Total
All  25%  20%  7%  3%  5%  19%  2%  18%  296
Panel  22%  22%  9%  6%  6%  16%  1%  16%  116
MAS  43%  14%  8%  2%  14%  8%  2%  8%  49
PC after 1 year  23%  20%  6%  1%  1%  22%  3%  24%  93
1  8The correlation coefficients at Table  14 suggest that the cases still pending after 12
months show a similar geographical  pattern both to all cases in the system and to those
which have completed  panel and Appellate Body processes with correlation coefficients
above 0.95.
Table  14 Correlation coefficients for geographical distribution and case status,  by
Complainant
All  Panel  MAS  PC after 1 year
All  1
Panel  0.969  1
MAS  0.675  0.643  1
PC after 1 year  0.961  0.906  0.478  1
The cases pending show no outstanding  geographical  bias. The cases settled by mutual
agreement,  however,  show a real divergence from other categories, with the US and
other developed countries. initiating 57%  of them and the NICs and TLDCs only initiating
16%.  These results are consistent with  Busch and Reinhardt's (2002) finding that pairs of
democracies are more likely to reach negotiated settlements,  but are  too aggregated  to
confirm the persistence of the trend in earlier cases.
Table  15 Case  status by Respondent
(% distribution compared  with all cases initiated)
US  EU  Canada  Japan  DC  NIC  TEC  TLDC  Total
All  27%  20%  4%  5%  3%  17%  3%  21%  276
Panel  40%  11%  8%  6%  2%  17%  0%  17%  108
MAS  9%  27%  0% *  9%  7%  16%  9%  23%  44
PC after 1 year  19%  26%  2%  3%  0%  22%  5%  23%  86
The respondent distribution shows less correlation between all cases, completed  panels
and those pending for a year than for the cases by Complainant.  Correlation coefficients
drop to around 0.6 for pending cases against panel settlements  and just over 0.9 when
compared with all cases.
Table  16 Correlation coefficients for geographical  distribution and  case status,  by
Respondent
All  Panel  MAS  PC after 1 year
All  1
Panel  0.867  1
MAS  0.618  0.155  1
PC after 1 year  0.906  0.595  0.845  1
Once more  it is the mutually agreed  settlement cases that stand out.  In particular the
TECs are respondents  in 9% of settled cases,  but in only 3%  of complaints generally.  By
contrast, the US when it is a respondent accounts for only 9% of the settlements, while
the EU  for 27%. The NICs and  TLDCs as respondents are involved in the broadly same
proportion of settled cases as complaints generally.
This might be where we see hints of the exercise of power.  A reasonable expectation
would be that more  powerful countries would seek a negotiated settlement where power is
19more important.  Conversely, weaker countries would be expected to prefer the legal
process to run its course.  Our data is consistent with these expectations.  Developed
countries are complainants in 60% of complaints,  but 81 % of settled cases (Table  13).
When NiCs and TLDCs are complainants they are much more  likely to proceed to panel
than to reach a negotiated settlement.  There is, however, a lot of static in this data.
There is particularly wide variation among the developed countries with regard to the
share of complaints they bring that they settle.  Further, these findings may be distorted
by the types of issues brought by who against whom,  as the likelihood of settlement varies
widely depending  on the type of issue at stake (see Table  17).
Examining case status in conjunction with type of issue (Table  17)  suggests once more
that the types of cases pending for more than a year are very similar to all cases and quite
similar to cases adjudicated in panels or before the Appellate  Body. Once again it is the
mutually agreed settlements which show a very different pattern to either cases pending
for more than a year or those settled. Only 9% of MAS cases involve trade defence cases
compared with 34%  of cases pending for a year and 45% of cases settled by a panel.  By
contrast 'within border' cases constitute 66%  of the MAS  cases compared with 40% of
panel cases and 38%  of pending cases.
Table  17 Case  status distributed by issue
Type of issue
mJ)  Within border  Trade defence  Other  Total
,  All  40%  32%  28%  276
u  Panel  39%  43%  19%  108
MAS  66%  9%  25%  44
o  PC after 1 year  33%  34%  34%  86
The preponderance of 'within border' cases and lack of trade defence cases among  the
MAS  may reflect no more than the importance of the US and the concomitant lack of
importance of NICs and TLDCs as complainants in this category. The causality might
equally run the other way, however.  The US government's low willingness to settle
complaints  brought against it might be due to the high preponderance of trade defence
cases against it.
There  are a couple of factors possibly at work here: one legal, the other political. The
absence of trade defence cases settled 'out of court' may reflect greater confidence by
complainants that they will win in front of a panel and that they are more likely to get their
way out of court on the 'within borders' cases.  At the same time, the domestic political
pay-off structures of the two types of disputes are very different for the respondent
country.  'Within border' measures often have broader political significance than do trade
defence instruments.  In addition, they are normally intended  to serve some public policy
objective and the negative impact on trade is a side-effect. Thus, there may be a stronger
incentive for respondents to reach a compromise that minimises the domestic  policy
changes  necessary to resolve the dispute. As the purpose of trade defence measures is
protectionism,  respondents  may gain domestic political advantage by holding out as long
as possible and no political benefit from compromising  early. A case-by-case examination
would be required to begin to address these issues adequately.
20Conclusions
Our headline findings are:
*  a country's trade share is a pretty robust indicator of its likelihood to be either a
complainant or a respondent;  thus the frequently remarked on absence of the least
developed countries from the dispute-settlement system can be explained by their low
volume of trade;
*  there is not much, if any, evidence of a bias against developing countries either as
complainants or respondents (Tables 3 and 4);
*  regulatory issues are fading as reasons for disputes and that trade defence disputes
are the rising issue (Tables 5-8);
*  Complainants overwhelmingly win (88%  of cases (Table 10)
*  There  is no strong  evidence that the rate of completion  of cases is biased against NICs
or TLDCs (Table 9);
*  Cases that are settled  by mutual  agreement have a very different profile from other
categories of settled cases, both geographically and by issue (Tables  14 and  17). This
may be evidence of some use of political/economic weight to persuade Respondents
to settle 'out of court.' On the other hand there is not much difference  in the country
distribution of cases that have still not reached a panel after 12 months and those that
go to panels (and  beyond) (Tables  12 and 13
This analysis suggests that the slug of cases that were instituted by the US  (and tit for tat
by the EU)  in the 1995-1998  period  biased perceptions of the system both in terms of
'bias' against LDCs and  in terms of the focus on 'within border' measures.  The more
recent surge in trade defence cases has brought the NICs and LDCs  more clearly into the
picture,  especially proportionately as the EU/US cases have fallen.
The weight of cases involving 'within border'  measures particularly during 1995-96  (when
they accounted for 60%  of all complaints brought) strongly suggests that the Uruguay
Round  and the dispute settlement system in particular served to resolve some of the
unsettled business of the GATT.  This is especially true with regard to TRIPs and SPS and
on environment and taxation.  Strikingly, but not surprisingly, complaints under the GATS
are few and far between.  The bottom-up and generally conservative nature of the
agreement may mean that few measures fall foul of commitments  made.
The absolute decline in the number of complaints concerning  'within -border' measures
warrants  some further attention.  Part of the answer,  as alluded to above,  may be that
some parties succeeded in incorporating in the Uruguay  Round agreements rules that
addressed specific existing barriers. There is some evidence that the US government, for
example,  very much had the  EU's  banana trade regime and ban on hormone-treated  beef
in its sights when it was negotiating the GATS and  SPS agreements. Another part of the
answer might be that the DSB has issued a number of rulings -- asbestos, shrimp-turtle,
and beef hormones -- that have interpreted  various agreements  in such a way as to
emphasise the legitimate scope for governments to adopt non-discriminatory,  but trade-
impeding  regulations. The high proportion of complainant victories may suggest that
complainants consider very carefully the likelihood of success before bringing a complaint.
Another possible explanation, facilitated by DSB interpretations of the rules, is that
governments have got better at making their rules compatible with existing multilateral
commitments.
21Thus two learning processes may be at work, one by potential  complainants about the
prospects of successful resolution (not just winning the case,  over a quarter of cases
completed by Panel or Appellate Body judgement have been engaged  in subsequent
adjudication/arbitration  on compliance - Table 1).  The other by governments  generally
getting used to the rules and learning to play the game better in terms of keeping their
regulations within permissible bounds.  Whatever the reason,  the more recent trend in
WTO cases suggests a return to the more familiar GATT-type border measures
environment.
This is potentially relevant to concerns about the legitimacy of the WTO.  Much of the
public concern about the power of the WTO concerns 'within border' cases,  especially
those involving SPS and TRIPs.  Arguably two different considerations have been at work.
One involved the delegation, with insufficient political oversight, to a non-democratic
international  organisation the power to interpret fairly general rules and principles, for
example with regard to SPS and the application of national treatment.  The other was the
adoption and enforcement of fairly precise rules that closely reflect the preferences of the
dominant player(s)  in the system,  e.g., TRIPs.  Irrespective of whether either of these
perceptions is correct, the shift away from such cases towards less broadly contentious
issues within more familiar rules, may take some of the heat out of the question of the
legitimacy of the WTO.
A related issue is how the experience  and process of dispute settlement is shaping the
current negotiations.  The experience with TRIPs cases, for example,  has generated
pressure for reform.  This is most evident in the 'Declaration  on the TRIPs Agreement and
Public Health'.8 The surge in trade defence cases over the past few years underlines the
pressure for reform of the anti-dumping provisions.
Overall the  Dispute SeKtlement  system seems to be settling down, with a lower than
expected number of cases in recent years,9 and moving back towards more traditional
border measures.  This may reflect that the DS system has addressed some of the
weaknesses of the GATT,  with some long-standing  irritations now addressed. The issues
that have been important in the DS system also feature  in the  Doha Agenda notably
TRIPs and anti-dumping,  which may point to its role as an indicator of a potential need for
revision to the rules.
Our findings are of course a snapshot or perhaps two snapshots of the periods  1995-98
and  1999-2002.  The change in the composition of cases with the increase in 'trade
defence' cases brought by middle income countries may or may not be a trend.  It is of
course unclear whether more involvement  in the system by poorer countries is a good or a
bad thing.  We may regret if they become more litigious or if indeed they are subject to
more trade barriers.  One may also wonder whether bursts of litigation do in fact have the
effect of resolving a problem.  The persistent series of findings against the US on trade
defence might indicate that they are systematically declining to modify rules or practices
that have been routinely condemned  by the DSB.  In  an ideal world we would hope that
the result will be a peak followed  by a compliance response.
8WT/MIN90l)IDEC/W/2,  14 November 2001.
9  The number of cases brought each year since  1999 has been significantly below the dispute trend predicted by Busch
and Reinhardt (2002).
22What would a new round bring?  One would hope that it would lead to fewer disputes if
the Contracting Parties can be persuaded to tidy up the ambiguities of the rules that
provoke some  of the disputes.  The prevalence of anti-dumping disputes of course raises
the question  of whether the EU and the US will be forced to accept the codification of the
Appellate Body's interpretation of the rules, or whether they will seek to tie the rules down
to what they thought they had agreed in the Uruguay Round.  The most regrettable
outcome would of course be if a new round introduced further disciplines and/or
ambiguities into the system which  had to be resolved anew by the DSB.
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25Annex A
Table  1 Complainants  by Respondents  1995 - 2002
Year
Complainant  Respondent  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  total
Us
EU  2  4  7  8  4  1  1  1  28
Canada  I  I  I  1  4
Japan  1  3  1  1  6
DC  I  I  I  1  4
NIC  2  3  3  1  4  5  18
TEC  I  1  2
TLDC  4  4  1  1  1  11
All  6  17  17  10  10  8  1  4
EU  US  0  3  4  5  4  5  2  2  25
EU  0
Canada  3  3
Japan  2  1  2  1  6
DC  0
NIC  2  4  3  3  1  1  14
TEC  0
TLDC  1  5  4  1  11
All  2  7  15  16  7  7  2  3
Canada  US  1  2  1  3  3  10
EU  2  1  3  6
Canada  0
Japan  I  I
DC  I  I
NIC  I  1  2
TEC  I  I
TLDC  I  1
All  5  3  1  4  2  1  3  3
Japan  US  I  1  2  2  6
EU  0
Canada  I  I
Japan  0
DC  0
NIC  I  I
TEC  0
TLDC  2  2
All  1  3  1  1  2  0  0  2
DC  US  2  3  5
EU  I  1  2
Canada  I  I
Japan  0
DC  I  1
NIC  I  I
TEC  2  1  3
TLDC  3  3
All  0  2  4  3  3  0  0  4
26NIC  uS  1  3  2  1  1  1  4  6  19
EU  2  1  1  1  1  1  2  3  12
Canada  2  1  3
Japan  0
DC  0
NIC  I  1  2  4
TEC  2  2
TLDC  4  1  3  5  1  1  15
All  4  10  5  3  5  8  10  10





NIC  1  I
TEC  2  1  2  S
TLDC  I  I
All  0  0  0  3  1  0  2  1
TLDC  US  1  6  2  2  2  13
EU  4  4  1  3  3  1  1  17
Canada  0
Japan  0
DC  2  2
NIC  I  I  1  4  7
TEC  I  I
TLDC  1  2  4  5  2  14
All  7  12  3  4  5  6  10  7
Total  25  54  46  44  35  30  28  34
27Annex
Table 2 Respondents by Complainants 1995 - 2002
Year
Respondent  Complainant  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Total
Us
EU  3  4  5  4  5  2  2  25
Canada  1  2  1  3  3  10
Japan  I  1  2  2  6
DC  2  3  5
NIC  1  3  2  1  1  1  4  6  19
TEC  0
TLDC  1  6  2  2  2  13
total  3  12  9  7  11  9  9  18
EU  US  2  4  7  8  4  1  1  1  28
Canada  2  1  3  6
Japan  0
DC  I  1  2
NIC  2  1  1  1  1  1  2  3  12
TEC  0
TLDC  4  4  1  3  3  1  1  17
total  10  10  10  15  8  2  4  6
Canada  US  I  I  I  1  4
EU  3  3
Japan  I  I
DC  I  I
NIC  2  1  3
TEC  0
TLDC  0
total  0  1  3  5  1  0  1  1
Japan  US  1  3  1  1  6
EU  2  1  2  1  6





total  4  4  3  1  0  0  0  1
DC  US  I  I  I  1  4
EU  0
Canada  I  I
Japan  0
DC  I  I
NIC  0
TEC  0
TLDC  2  2
total  2  1  1  2  0  0  0  2
28Year
Respondent  Complainant  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Total
NIC  US  2  3  3  1  4  5  18
EU  2  4  3  3  1  1,  14
Canada  I  1  2
Japan  I  I
DC  I  1
NIC  I  1  2  4
TEC  I  I
TLDC  I  I  1  4  7
total  5  8  7  6  8  7  6  1
TEC  US  I  1  2
EU  0
Canada  1  I
Japan  0
DC  2  1  3
NIC  2  2
TEC  2  1  2  5
TLDC  1  1
total  1  6  0  3  1  1  2  0
TLDC  US  4  4  1  1  1  11
EU  1  5  4  1  11
Canada  I  I
Japan  2  2
DC  3  3
NIC  4  1  3  5  1  1  15
TEC  I  I
TLDC  1  2  4  5  2  14
total  0  12  13  5  6  11  6  5
Total  25  54  46  44  35  30  28  34
29Annex B
I. Regression Run on All Years All Cases
Dependent Variable  Explanatory Variables  R2
Number of Cases by Complainant  Intercept  Export Share
0.0214  4.1564  0.8012
0.0603  22.8031
Number of Cases by Respondent  Intercept  Import Share
-0.0467  3.9601  0.8858
-0.1812  31.6380
II. Regression Run on Years from 95-98 All
Cases
Dependent Variable  Explanatory Variables  R2
Number of Cases by Complainant  Intercept  Export Share
-0.2101  2.7859  0.8242
-0.9545  24.5912
Number of Cases by Respondent  Intercept  Import Share
0.0516  2.0668  0.8252
0.2992  24.6801
Ill. Regression Run on Years from 99-02 All
Cases
Dependent Variable  Explanatory Variables  R2
Number of Cases by Complainant  Intercept  Export Share
0.2315  1.3705  0.6710
1.4100  16.2200
Number of Cases by Respondent  Intercept  Import Share
-0.0983  1.8933  0.7391
-0.4820  19.1145
IV. Regression Run on All Years BUT Only Trade Defense
Cases
Dependent Variable  Explanatory Variables  R2
Number of Cases by Complainant  Intercept  Export Share
0.1409  1.1702  0.7595
1.2503  20.1817
Number of Cases by Respondent  Intercept  import Share
-0.1632  1.7037  0.7427
-0.8974  19.2969
V. Regression Run on All Years BUT Only NON  Trade Defense Cases
Dependent Variable  Explanatory Variables  R2
Number of Cases by Complainant  Intercept  Export Share
-0.1195  2.9862  0.7577
-0.4136  20.0849
Number of Cases by Respondent  Intercept  Import Share
0.1165  2.2564  0.8197
0.6070  24.2191
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